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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, there was turmoil in the field of
Macroeconomics, which resulted in the Keynesian ‘revolution’. However, the
current Great Recession, the worst crisis that capitalism has faced since then,
has failed, at least so far, to generate an upheaval in the teaching and practice
of Macroeconomics. This seems bizarre as if nothing has happened and the
economists are just going about doing business as usual. Without going
into the politics of why this is so, let me just focus on how Macroeconomics
ought to be taught to students at the intermediate level, which gives them
an overall perspective on the subject1. I must note that this article has been
inspired by an editorial published in EPW [2013].
Macroeconomics as a subject proper came into existence with the writ-
ings of John Maynard Keynes2. There were debates during his time about
how to characterise a capitalist economy, most of these are still a part of the
discussion among economists. Keynes [1936, 1937] argued that capitalism is
a fundamentally unstable system so the state needs to intervene to control
this instability.
Keynes [1936] has been interpreted in different, often contradictory,
ways. In today’s context, they can be broadly classified in two categories:
Post Keynesian and New Keynesian. Ideally, a macroeconomics curriculum
as a pedagogical exercise should give equal weightage to the two traditions
to give the students a holistic perspective on the subject. This is more so
because the policy prescriptions flowing out of these paradigms are palpa-
bly at variance with each other and such a training can help the students
make an informed judgement. This paper is divided in five sections. Section
2 presents the central question that Keynes raised followed by two sections
each dealing with the Post-Keynesian and New-Keynesian traditions respec-
tively. The last section concludes the paper.
1What is presented here is just an outline of how it could be taught and is not in any
sense exhaustive. The same holds for the references.
2While Michal Kalecki arrived at most of the Keynesian conclusions ahead of Keynes,
he was inaccessible to the English readers as his initial writings were in Polish.
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2 The Keynesian Proble´matique
Keynes [1937] presented a simplified version of his arguments made earlier
in Keynes [1936]. It would suffice here to just use the former as the basis
for the discussion to follow. The central question that Keynes [1936, 1937]
raised was whether capitalism is a self-regulating system i.e. it reaches full
utilisation of capital and/or labour or a fundamentally unstable one that in
general there is a simultaneous underutilisation of capital and unemploy-
ment of labour?
Prior to Keynes, it was believed that there could be unemployment of
labour provided there is a downward rigidity of real wages in the labour
market which restricts labour demand ahead of its supply at that level of
real wages. So, unless these rigidities are removed, unemployment cannot
be removed (see figure 1). So, the causality moved from real wages →
employment → output (through the production function).
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Figure 1: Real Wage Rigidity and Classical Unemployment
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On the contrary, Keynes’ explanation for unemployment was just the re-
verse (see fig. 2) i.e. since the causality moves from investment (I)→ output
(O)→ employment (E)→money wages (w¯)→marginal cost (mc)→ prices
(p) (hence the real wages w¯/p), investment is primarily at the source of it.
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Figure 2: Investment, Multiplier and Keynesian Involuntary Unemployment
Since investment determines the level of employment, absence of involun-
tary unemployment requires the investment to be at a level which generates
the output corresponding to full employment. For that to happen, following
two conditions need to be fulfilled together :
1. that this level of aggregate investment lies on the investment function,
which Keynes named as the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI)
schedule.
2. that the real rate of interest is such that this MEI is materialized.
Keynes argued that there is many a slip between the cup and the lip
for these two conditions to be satisfied. In the event that they are not, the
capitalist state should intervene and push the economy towards its potential.
But why can’t these conditions be satisfied?
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First, since investment (I) is a decision, which inherently entails expec-
tations about an uncertain3 future, its returns are unstable with respect to
the magnitude of investment. Let’s say that an investment project with a
certain life of periods has a stream of expected returns. The average effi-
ciency of this investment is given by that rate of discount, which generates a
present value exactly equal to the total cost of investment and the marginal
efficiency given by the return on investment at the margin. Keynes believed
that the marginal efficiency of investment falls (see fig. 3(A)) as the amount
of investment rises because of two reasons: (a) every additional unit of cap-
ital adds lesser to the output than the previous one (decreasing returns to
scale because labour is also increasing in the process), which he believed was
a long-run factor; (b) cost of investment rises because the price of capital
goods rises as a result of its increasing demand (a short-run factor).
Quite aside from fundamental uncertainty, there is some risk premium
(ρ) consisting of lender’s/borrower’s risk. Lender’s risk consists of the pre-
mium that the lender adds to take into account the risk in the event the
expected rate of returns turns out be different from that claimed by the bor-
rower. On the other hand, borrower’s risk consists of the premium that the
borrowers themselves assign to the project in the event that the expectations
do not turn out to be true.
Rate of interest (i) enters this decision-making in terms of opportunity
cost of earning returns on interest-bearing financial assets like bonds. A
capitalist is making a choice between investing in real capital and in financial
assets which gives a prospective real return i.e. nominal minus the expected
inflation. But how is the division done? On the margin, the expected returns
on the two should be the same. But how is the rate of interest determined?
We discuss this point next.
Second, in the world of exogenous money of Keynes [1936, 1937], the
nominal rate of interest is determined by the demand for and fixed stock of
money (M¯). A part of the demand for money is given by its purpose for
monetary transactions, which for simplicity can be taken as a constant frac-
tion of the nominal level of income. Rate of interest is that premium which
must be paid at the margin for the asset holders to absorb the remaining
stock of money (Keynes [1937] called it inactive balances) since money is
a non-interest bearing asset. If the demand for these inactive balances is
less than its given supply, then the interest rates will decrease to entice the
asset-holders to absorb the remaining liquidity. This gives us a negative
relationship between the nominal rate of interest and liquidity preference
(LP ). But this preference for liquidity (despite zero monetary return) is
not just dependent on the current rate of interest but also on long term
state of expectations, which for simplicity, can be assumed to be given by
3Uncertain in the Keynesian sense of fundamental uncertainty and not some calculable
probabilistic risk
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the stream of expected rates of interest. To show this, if for a given level of
current rate of interest, the expected rate of interest rises, then the demand
for inactive balances will rise even if the current rate of interest is high be-
cause the agent will want to wait for tomorrow to buy the interest-bearing
asset rather than buying it today. In other words, a higher expected rate
of interest would shift the liquidity preference outward for a given level of
current rate of interest. Moreover, there is a minimum level of nominal rate
of interest (which can even be zero in certain circumstances) below which it
cannot fall, which is given by the lender’s risk (famously known as the rate
of interest associated with the liquidity trap).
One can show this causality for the ex ante investment in the following
manner which can be read together with the rest of the Keynesian causality:
MEI ↘
I¯ → O︸ ︷︷ ︸
Flow Equilibrium
→ E → w¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Workers’ Bargaining
→ mc→ p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit Maximisation
M¯ + LP → i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stock Equilibrium
+ρ↗
Assuming, for simplicity, the rate of inflation to be zero (i.e. the real
and the nominal rate of interest are the same), it can be seen from the
above that the level of economic activity is determined by the level of ex
ante investment, which itself is determined by the point at which the down-
ward sloping MEI intersects the exogenously given rate of interest and risk
premium. This level of investment in turn determines the output through
the output multiplier and the level of employment through the employment
multiplier. This level of employment determines next period’s level of money
wages through workers’ bargaining. These wages and given level of labour
coefficient determine the marginal cost which in turn determines the level
of prices in conditions of perfect competition.
This entire process is presented in figure 2. The arrow originates on the
y-axis in the third quadrant, where the MEI and the interest rate determine
the level of investment. This level of investment then through the route
of income multiplier (with an intercept representing autonomous factors of
demand) determines the level of output in the second quadrant (demand
determines its supply). For that level of output, the marginal cost (based
on the given money wages) determines the level of price in the first quadrant.
For the same given money wage, the real wage as it were comes out of the
wash for this price level in the fourth quadrant. It can be seen clearly that
‘fixity’ of money wages plays a role in providing an anchor to the price
system but is not responsible for unemployment. It is the lack of ex ante
investment in comparison to its full employment counterpart that generates
involuntary unemployment.
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The central component, investment, depends on unstable expectations
showing in a volatile MEI and interest rate, which is dependent on an unsta-
ble liquidity preference schedule (captured by the stream of expected rates
of interest). So, there are two independent reasons for why the economy
might not settle down at the full employment equilibrium except by chance.
It is this chance that the orthodox theories before Keynes had focussed on,
which is why Keynes [1936] called this equilibrium a special case of his gen-
eral theory of employment, interest and money. And the remedy to this
problem of simultaneous unemployment of labour and excess capacity, ac-
cording to him, lied in an astute combination of fiscal and monetary policies
with a clear preference for the former because of its direct impact on the
level of activity.
3 The Post-Keynesian Response
The post Keynesian response developed through the writings of one of his
contemporaries, Kalecki [1971] and his pupil at Cambridge, to name a cou-
ple like Kaldor [1986], Robinson [1971]. I will present here the essential
arguments they made as either a critique or addition to what Keynes [1936]
wrote.
3.1 Different components of the Post-Keynesian framework
3.1.1 Kalecki [1937]’s principle of increasing risk and MEI
Kalecki [1937] argued that a determinate level of investment in Keynes [1936]
required the MEI function to decline with the volume of investment. In the
absence of that, the level of investment becomes indeterminate since both
the MEI function and the interest rate plus risk function will either run
parallel or coincide (see fig. 3(A)). But in reality not only is it determinate
but within an industry, there are different sizes of the firm which is also
impossible to explain in Keynes’ argument.
Kalecki [1937] argued that both the underlying assumptions in Keynes
[1936] need to be questioned to answer these questions. On the one hand,
diseconomies of scale do not have any economic justification since the same
unit of enterprise could just be replicated leading to just a doubling of the
potential output. On the other hand, imperfect competition (which will lead
to a declining MEI function) doesn’t fit well with the Keynes’ otherwise
perfectly competitive framework and it also cannot explain different firm
sizes within an industry.
Kalecki argued that the assumption of a risk premium independent of the
level of investment under the conditions of external finance is not justified.
In fact, the risk increases as the level of debt as a proportion (gearing ratio)
of one’s own capital rises for two reasons. It endangers the wealth position
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of the borrower as well as the increase in ‘illiquidity’ in the event of a distress
sale. If not the borrower, at least the lender who is entrusting the former
with her own capital will assign a higher risk premium with a rise in the
gearing ratio beyond a certain point (at/after the point denoted by own
capital of the borrower). As is obvious, a firm with a lower own capital will
have the risk curve rising much ahead of a firm with a higher own capital,
thereby, leading to a comparatively lower level of investment.
Steindl [1945] further built upon Kalecki [1937] by arguing that instead
of constant returns to scale, there are increasing returns to scale. So, even
within an industry larger firms will have access to techniques, because of
minimum scale of operation required, which have higher rates of profit. This
will show up as an upward sloping MEI i.e. an exact opposite of what Keynes
had shown. So, smaller firms might be at a disadvantage both because of a
rising risk curve and MEI function.
In an oligopolistic set-up, given that large firms are producing for more
or less fixed market shares, the level of investment could be limited by
the market and not by access to credit. In other words, the MEI after
increasing to a certain point becomes vertical corresponding to the market
share. Fig. 3(B) shows that there could be a combination of firms, smaller
ones constrained by credit and larger ones primarily by market. This makes
the effect of interest rates limited mostly to relatively smaller sized firms
and, hence, higher the concentration in an industry lower the effectiveness
of interest rates.
At the macroeconomic level, the investment function4 can be seen as
analytically constructed using two components: (a) that which is determined
by the interest rate plus the risk premium and the MEI (depicted by the
intercept of the investment function in figure 5); and (b) which is determined
by the level of output (shown by the upward sloping investment function in
the investment-output plane). The arrow originating in the fourth quadrant
gives primacy to the intercept of the investment function determined by the
MEI and the risk premium and the interest rate. Since the intercept is less
responsive to the interest rate for reasons given above, the MEI curve is
almost vertical except at very high rates of interest where even for larger
firms, the opportunity cost of investing in real capital becomes too high. So,
the fluctuations in the autonomous level of investment is primarily driven
the fluctuating component in the MEI.
But what determines the rate of interest? We discuss it next.
3.1.2 Endogenous money, short and long-term rate of interest
In Keynes [1937], the rate of interest was determined by the stock equilib-
rium in the demand and supply of inactive balances. Since the supply of
4A more comprehensive and recent discussion of different investment functions is avail-
able in Setterfield [2010].
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Figure 3: (A) Keynes’ Downward Sloping MEI Vs Kalecki’s Horizontal MEI;
(B) MEI in an Oligopolistic Set-up
inactive balances is fixed and its demand is inversely related to the rate of
interest, the rate of interest adjusts to bring the latter in equilibrium with
the former. So, the supply of money is exogenous while the rate of interest
is endogenous.
As opposed to this, Kaldor [1986] argued that in the modern world of
fiat money, supply of money cannot be argued to be exogenous. In fact, it is
the interest rate that the central bank can control and even that, the short
term rates of interest (for eg. the repo rate for India or federal funds rate
for the US). At that rate of interest, the level of money demand determines
the supply of money. So, the causality in this stock equilibrium moves from
interest rate → expected rate of interest → demand for inactive balance →
supply of inactive balance. So, it moves in the reverse compared to Keynes’
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causality. But this is not the end of the story since what matters for invest-
ment, if at all, is the long-term rate of interest since the terms of two assets
i.e. capital goods and the financial asset have to be comparable. How are
the two rates linked?
[Kalecki, 1939, ch. 6] presented such a linkage. In order to do that,
we need to bring in a representative short term asset (say a treasury bill)
and a long term asset (say a consol) and ask the question as to how does
a wealth-holder decide between these two assets? What are the relative
(dis)advantages of holding one over the other? Since the term of a consol is
more than that of the bill, it is not the current rate of interest on bills that
matters but what its expected value ieS will be over the term of the consol.
While bills protect the integrity of the principal, consol can depreciate in
value, the risk of which can be estimated. On the other hand, the expected
short term rate of interest is subject to uncertainty, even though the current
rate of interest on bond is not. Moreover, rebuying of bills over the relevant
period also involves some costs. Assuming these costs to be negligible, the
condition of indifference of a wealth holder requires the expected short-term
rate of interest to be equal to the long term rate of interest net of the
expected depreciation.
Any change in the expected short-term rate of interest will affect the
long-term rate of interest as well but this relationship will not be one-to-
one because the risk of depreciation is not exogenous but varies with the
current yield on the consol. This is so because for every rise/fall in the long-
term rate of interest, its expected depreciation falls/rises. So, a fall/rise in
the central bank rate, there is a fall/rise in the long term interest rate along
with a rise/fall in expected depreciation. Given that on the margin, the long
term rate of interest net of the expected depreciation has to be equal to the
expected short-term rate of interest, change in the latter is only partially
reflected in the long term rate of interest and expected depreciation. Based
on this, Kalecki [1939] argued that in a world of uncertainty, the only basis
for making an expectation about the interest rate could at best be some sort
of an average of its past values. So, at this step itself the fluctuations in
the actual short-term of interest is evened out reflected in a relatively stable
expected rate. Since investment is dependent on the long-term rate of inter-
est, which itself does not follow a one-to-one relationship with the expected
rate, the volatile movement of investment across the business cycles cannot
be explained by interest rates. Moreover, it limits the scope of monetary
policy as a countercyclical instrument during a business cycle.
3.1.3 The Multiplier: Output Vs Price Adjustment
After incorporating these suggestions, investment becomes a function of long
term expectations, expected level of demand and the long-term real rate of
interest. In this tradition, it is the past level of demand which influences
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expectations about the future level of demand. So, for the short-run, the
resulting level of investment can be taken as autonomous. How does that
determine the level of output and employment for the economy as a whole
Kalecki [1971] used Marx’s department schema to explain this relationship.
? presents a neat algebraic representation of this argument.
Abstaining from trade and the government sector, suppose there are two
departments of production: investment (I) and consumption goods (II) with
different labour productivities, prices, employment level. The two sectors
are vertically integrated. Kalecki further assumed that workers consume
all their wages whereas capitalists only a part of it. Figure 4 shows the
macroeconomic equilibrium to be described below.
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Figure 4: The Multiplier: Output Vs Price Adjustment
Since the workers and the capitalists of both the sectors are dependent
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on department II for consumption, department I becomes the leading sector.
Macroeconomic equilibrium between the two sectors can be established only
when the wage bill plus the consumption demand of capitalists of depart-
ment I is met by the part of consumption goods left after the wage bill and
consumption demand of the capitalistst of department II. For a given level
of parameters, this creates a strict proportion between the two departments.
Combining the two departments in nominal terms will give us the overall
income of the economy.
Any exogenous increase in investment (by movements in MEI and/or
interest rates), leads to adjustments in department II either through output
changes (ahead of the full employment) or price changes (a case of full
employment). Let’s discuss them one at a time.
Output adjustment arises because of an increase in the demand of con-
sumption goods as a result of increased wage bill and consumption out of
increased profits in department I. Initially, production in department II in-
creases by this amount but since the workers and capitalists in department
II itself consume a portion of this increased income, there is a cycle of pro-
duction that is generated. This cycle of production in department II stops
only when the amount left after deducting the wage bill and consumption
of the capitalists of department II is exactly equal to the initial increase
in demand of department I for these goods. It follows that the overall in-
crease in income is greater than the initial increase in investment, hence,
the name output multiplier. Also, it can be seen that increase in ex ante
investment has generated an equivalent amount of ex post savings arising
out of increased profits of capitalists of both the sectors. Corresponding to
the increase in income, there is an increase in employment as shown in fig.
4.
MEI ↘
I¯ → Y → E︸ ︷︷ ︸
Flow Equilibrium
M ← iS → ieS → iL + ρ(I)↗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Transmission mechanism
If, however, the production of department II cannot be increased because
of full employment, this creates an upward pressure on prices of consump-
tion goods. Any increase in the price with given money wages of workers in
department II means a movement of income from the workers to the cap-
italists of this sector. Since the capitalists save a portion of their income
unlike the workers, such a movement generates savings corresponding to the
increase in the demand originating in department I. This is the process of
forced savings.
In both the cases, investment generates an equivalent amount of savings,
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whether through an increase in income of both the workers and the capi-
talists (output adjustment) or through tilting the distribution of income in
favour of the capitalists (price adjustment).
The overall process of macroeconomic equilibrium of this framework is
shown in figure 5. So, the investment level determined by its two compo-
nents creates an equivalent amount of savings in the second quadrant. Once
the output generated in the process reaches the full employment/capacity
level, the adjusment takes place through an increase in the level of prices
with wages remaining fixed, thereby increasing the level of savings for that
level of output or rotating the savings function anti-clockwise in the second
quadrant.
3.1.4 Endogenous business cycles in Kalecki [1971], Minsky [1975]
While the level of investment in a period is autonomous, it changes across
periods due to the changes in MEI, the risk premium and the long term rates
of interest. And since investment determines income, business cycles are
generated because of the cyclical movement in the level of investment. Two
such endogenous cycles can be enumerated here: Kalecki [1971], which deals
with the inherent instability of the investment process itself and Minsky
[1975], which deals with the financial instabilities inherent in the investment
process.
Kalecki [1971] He showed that there is a gap between the decisions and
implementation of investment plans. While he made different attempts to
formalise his business cycle models, the essence of his argument can be
presented as follows. He used the current rate of profit as a representative
of measuring the MEI (while also taking into account long-term factors but
these affected the trend rate of growth). But since rate of profit is profit
divided by the capital stock, this means that gross investment is affected
positively by the level of profit and inversely by the stock of capital. If
we abstain from the long-term factors, investment tends to move cyclically
around its replacement requirements. Let’s see how.
There are three components to an investment process followed chrono-
logically: orders, production and delivery, each spaced by time. The level of
profit in a period is determined by the production of investment goods (itself
determined by the orders made earlier) in that period through the multiplier
noted above whereas the stock of capital changes only once the delivery has
been made. So, an investment order sets in motion two process at the same
time. On the one hand, it increases the level of profit once this order is put
into production. On the other hand, the delivery of these produced goods
adds to the capital stock only when they rise above the level of replacement
requirements. So, what happens to the rate of profit is dependent on the rel-
ative movements of these two processes. In the recovery phase of a business
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cycle, rate of investment rises because profits are rising but eventually this
rate starts falling because once the deliveries cross the level of replacement
requirements, capital stock itself starts rising. As the rate of increase of or-
ders falls, this process gets aggravated further since the profits are not rising
at the earlier rate whereas deliveries of the earlier orders start pouring in.
This opposite movement brings investment orders to a halt which eventually
starts declining because the capital stock is still rising. This downward fall
is the recessionary phase of the cycle. This process bottoms out when a fall
in investment leads to a fall in the deliveries eventually below the level of
replacement requirements leading to an absolute fall in the stock of capital,
thereby, recovering the rate of profit. Once again the recovery starts.
Minsky [1975] Minsky argued that instability of finance required for in-
vestment creates the business cycles. Expectations about profits are based
on current conditions, so during periods of optimism, capitalists might over-
invest both because of low borrower’s as well as lender’s risk. This increases
their gearing ratio, thereby, increasing the stock of debt while increasing
their potential profits, the undistributed part of which are cash flows. So,
he wrote about three regimes of finance: hedge (cash flow is more than both
the principal and interest commitments), speculative (cash flow is enough
to only pay for interest commitments and not the principal) and ponzi (cash
flow is less than both) which this process of investment expansion results in
in that order. Such a movement leads to bankruptcy of firms indulging in
ponzi finance and more the number of such firms more is the possibility of
a financial crisis, thereby, increasing the lender’s as well as borrower’s risk.
This restricts investment and ultimately leads to its collapse.
3.2 Policy and output-inflation trade-off
So far, we have not discussed the last link in the Keynesian framework, i.e.
determination of nominal wages and prices except partly while discussing
price adjustment. Kalecki [1971] had famously said that while the prices are
demand-determined for the primary goods it is cost-determined for manu-
factured goods. The overall inflation level of the economy will then be a
weighted average of the two inflation rates depending, weights determined
by their share in the overall expenditure. So, the dynamics for inflation in
these sectors require different policy response.
In the case of manufactured goods, Keynes [1936], Kalecki [1971] pro-
vided a theoretical argument, which was empirically studied by Phillips
[1958], that the level of wages is determined by the bargaining power of
the working class, which varies positively (inversely) with the level of em-
ployment (unemployment). Workers bargain for an ex ante wage share but
can actually make only a nominal claim in the form of a nominal wage, the
calculation of which takes into account last period’s price level as an indi-
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cator of the future price level. This process generates an inflation dynamics
since current prices, which are a markup over these negotiated wage cost,
get linked to the last period’s price. This was the dynamics which generated
the famous Phillips curve showing a positive relationship between inflation
and the rate of employment5.
This generated the so-called policy trade-off between output and in-
flation. A higher level of output entailed higher inflation so it was upto
the policy maker to make the choice of correct combination between the
two. This framework, however, was questioned both by Friedman [1977]
and Rowthorn [1977] though from different perspectives. They argued that
the expectations of the workers is not static but dynamic so they project not
last period’s price but its level of inflation to calculate current nominal wage
demands. So, it is not the level of inflation which is a function of the rate
of employment but the change in its level. So, there is a rate of unemploy-
ment called the non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)
where the level of inflation is static and on either side it is either increasing
or decreasing continuously (inflation instability). While Friedman made an
additional assertion that NAIRU also corresponds to the full-employment
level, Rowthorn [1977] argued that having different dynamics these two rates
are totally different.
This upward sloping Phillips curve, however, has been challenged both
on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. While a rise in nominal wages
are acceptable to workers, an absolute fall might not be acceptable and even
if that is not the case, there will at least be downward rigidity in prices
in the presence of oligopolies (Patnaik [2009]). So, while there might be
a deceleration of inflation, there will hardly ever be a disinflation in the
economy. There could be a whole range of employment (and output) for
which the prices in the manufacturing sector will not fall even though they
happen to be on the decelerating side of NAIRU. To calculate the overall
inflation rate for the economy, we need to calculate the weighted average of
manufacturing goods’ inflation, which is flat along the x-axis for a certain
portion and increases afterwards, and the primary goods inflation which
is determined by different dynamics altogether. Thus, we get an inflation
curve which has a horizontal portion and then slopes upwards (see figure 5).
What if the economy is stuck in this portion i.e. with low employment and
no impending inflation instability? It is here that the role of policy becomes
central.
3.2.1 Monetary Vs Fiscal Policy
The preceding discussion tells us that for the monetary policy to be effective,
the following transmission mechanism has to work. An expansionary mon-
5To be sure, Phillips’ study was a relationship between the change in nominal wages
as a negative function of the rate of unemployment
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Figure 5: Macroeconomic Equilibrium in the Post-Keynesian Framework
etary policy i.e. a fall in the nominal central bank rate will have to affect
the nominal expected bank rate, which together with its effect on inflation
determines the real bank rate6, and that in turn will have to affect the real
long term rate of interest and that will have to affect the level of investment.
Consider this with the possibility that the long term rate of interest does
not have a one-to-one correspondence even with the expected bank rate. All
of this makes the monetary transmission even more difficult. Keynes had
famously referred to this as ‘many a slip between the cup and the lips’.
MEI ↘
I¯ → Y
M ← iS︸︷︷︸
Monetary Policy
→ ieS → iL + ρ(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Transmission
↗↖ Govt. Exp︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fiscal Policy
↗
Fiscal policy (FP), on the other hand, was considered to have a direct
impact on the level of output, private investment and employment. It re-
6This is so because inflation itself may depend on the nominal interest rate due to
the cost channel of monetary policy for a given spectrum of their profit margins (Patnaik
[1997], Lima and Setterfield [2010]). And it is possible that there is a commensurate
movement in inflation leaving the real rate unaffected.
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futed the three famous objections to fiscal policy: crowding out of private
investment as the interest rates rise, inflation as a result of monetisation of
this deficit and increased foreign indebtedness to finance the fiscal deficit.
First, a higher government expenditure in a world where interest rates are
determined by the central bank cannot lead to an increase in the interest
rate and affect private investment adversely. On the contrary, it increases
the level of capacity utilisation for private firms, so their levels of profits
also swell. This is the crowding-in effect. Second, monetisation of deficit
is not the case of too-much-money-chasing-too-few goods since running of
the deficit itself adds to the pool of goods. Third, increased foreign indebt-
edness has to do with the leakage of demand from the economy through
imports resulting from an expansionary process but that has nothing to do
with government expenditure per se. In fact, by controlling the kind of ac-
tivities which are less import intensive, such an expenditure unlike private
investment can plug these leakages.
All in all, a higher level of fiscal expenditure could push the economy
towards full employment and the business cycles could be tamed by us-
ing countercyclical fiscal policy implemented in conjunction with an astute
monetary policy.
3.2.2 Kalecki [1943]’s political aspects of full employment
Given his training in Marxian economics, Kalecki [1943], however, was far
more cautious in drawing the last conclusion. He argued that on pure eco-
nomic grounds, it might make sense for the capitalists to accept expansion-
ary policies as they generate profits for them as well. But capitalism is not
just an economic system but a political system beset with class antagonims.
The opposition to full employment policies from the capitalists could be on
different grounds.
First, capitalists do not mind trading off a portion of their profits for
this purpose because ‘under a regime of permanent full employment, the
‘sack’ would cease to play its role as a ‘disciplinary’ measure.’ Second,
capitalists are wary of the areas in which the government might spend, so,
subsidies are opposed on moral grounds while public investment on the fear
of nationalisation of such assets. Third, capitalists use business cycle as
a controlling device to maintain their hegemony in the production process.
But with an entity which could stabilize this fundamentally unstable system,
this powerful controlling device itself disappears.
4 The New Keynesian Response
Without any loss of generality, one could state that the other interpretation
of Keynes [1936], popularly known as the new Keynesian economics today,
reads the Keynesian proble´matique from the right to the left i.e.
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↙E ← w¯
p
:The Labour Market
Aggregate Supply↖
Inflation← p¯ :The Product Market
Aggregate Demand↙
Having interpreted Keynesian framework as above, the attempt here is
to provide microeconomic foundations to the otherwise ad hoc assertion of
wage-price rigidities in the old version.
4.1 The Basic New Keynesian Framework
Research in this tradition has been practically divided on the output mar-
ket and labour market. Involuntary unemployment has been explained by
showing various mechanisms through which ridigity in real wages manifests
itself. On the other hand, disequilibrium in the output market is generated
through some form of price rigidity. Let us look at the labour market first.
The causality here is critical since the fundamental source of instability is
some form of rigidity in either the price or the wage or both.
4.1.1 Labour market and Real Wage Rigidity
Disparate attempts have been made in this tradition to explain why the
labour market stabilises at real wage rates higher than the market clearing
ones, thereby, generating involuntary unemployment. They can be cat-
egorised as follows: (a) efficiency wage due to adverse selection, labour
turnover, shirking, fairness; (b) insiders wield a higher bargaining capac-
ity than the outsiders (Snowdon and Vane [2005] present a comprehensive
literature survey of this and other macroeconomic schools of thought).
Efficiency Wage Theories These theories maintain that the productiv-
ity of workers are directly proportional to the level of real wages. So, the
same number of workers could produce more if the real wages are more.
Does that mean that you keep increasing real wages? No, because the rate
of increase of effort itself diminishes as the real wages rise. Firms would
try to minimize the wage cost per efficiency units, so it possible that this
efficiency real wage is greater than the market clearing equilibrium wage.
These theories also attempt to explain why the efficiency rises with real
wages.
Adverse selection model talks of the signalling by the firms through
higher real wages to the workers with best abilities and avoid the ‘lemons’ in
the labour market (Weiss [1980]). Salop [1979] showed that turnover costs of
hiring and firing workers is very high so, the firms are willing to pay higher
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real wages to deter them from quitting. To control shirking by the work-
ers, which is otherwise difficult to measure, firms are willing to pay higher
real wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]). Workers might not just be worried
about their wages alone but also the relative wages, so the firms in their
attempt to being ‘fair’ to their workers pay higher wages Akerlof [1982].
Insider-Outsider Models These models focus on the reasons for why
those unemployed do not offer labour at lower than prevailing wages, thereby,
bringing the labour market equilibrium where the all offering work are in-
deed employed. Here, unlike the case of efficiency wages where the firms are
willing to pay extra for higher productivity, it is the interaction between the
insiders and the outsiders who ensure that real wages are not bid down.
Knowing that there are costs involved with firing the insiders and hiring
the outsiders, for eg. search costs, severance pay and litigation costs, training
the new employees, the outsiders use this as a leverage to negotiate for higher
real wages. Presence of labour unions increases this leverage further as they
can decide to go for actions like strikes, shut-downs, thereby increasing the
costs till their demands are met. To avoid these costs, firms acquiesce to
these demands, thereby, creating a wage differential between the insiders
and the outsiders.
A canonical representation of such a disequilibrium in the labour market
is shown in figure 6. In the fourth quadrant, the level of unemployment U is
generated because the real wages fail to adjust to their ‘natural’ level. This
is shown through the arrow originating on the y-axis in the fourth quadrant.
4.1.2 Product Market and Price Rigidity
Aggregate demand plays only a passive role because it is assumed to be
sufficiently elastic to price changes. So, if only the prices were completely
flexible (a vertical supply schedule), there would never be a problem of
lack of aggregate demand because price adjustment will take care of any
disequilibrium in the output market. Therefore, most of the theories in this
tradition focus on the reason for why prices are rigid to adjust whether as a
result of imperfect competition in the product markets or rigidities in wages
in the labour market. Cyclical movements in output take place because of
the interaction between an upward sloping aggregate supply curve and a
downward sloping aggregate demand curve.
Aggregate Supply Function The aggregate supply curve is central to
this framework. The attempt here is to show that prices are not completely
flexible so there is always part price and part quantity adjustment to any
macroeconomic shock that takes place whether from the demand or the
supply side. Such shocks, therefore, persist through fluctuations in output
and employment around the full-employment equilibrium. Before we go into
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the reasons for why prices are rigid, let’s see how this generates an aggregate
supply curve which is positively sloped in the inflation-output plane.
The new Keynesian price mechanism is derived from microfoundations
of optimal pricing by firms with some degree of price rigidity. It is captured
by assuming that in each period, a random fraction of firms do not reset
their price based on the profit maximization exercise i.e. marginal revenue
equals the marginal cost Calvo [1983]. As the output rises, marginal costs
rise, which should have translated into a rise in prices but not all firms
do that simultaneously. Hence, the prices rise but not to the same extent
as they would have had all firms followed the profit maximisation exercise.
The fact that there is always a fraction of firms sticking to their past prices
creates some degree of rigidity in the overall inflation, the degree of which
is directly proportional to that fraction. This gives us a positively sloped
aggregate supply curve. Now, let’s see why the prices are rigid in the first
place.
New Keynesian models are based on firms engaged in imperfect com-
petition i.e., the firms instead of being price takers are price makers. So,
the firms choose both the price and output depending on the principles of
profit maximisation. A firm will increase its production by one unit only
if the additional revenue generated is greater than the additional produc-
tion cost. This additional revenue itself will depend on the extent of an
increase in sales and the fall in prices. If the sales increases proportionately
higher than the fall in prices, additional revenue will be generated (this pro-
portion is measured by the elasticity of demand). On the other hand, the
increase in marginal cost will depend on the increase in labour cost arising
out of the falling marginal productivity of labour. Firm’s profit maximising
point will be where the additional revenue is equal to the additional cost i.e.
the famous microeconomic condition for imperfectly competitive markets,
marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost. So, the price chosen will
be such that this condition is satisfied. This makes the prices a function
of nominal wages, marginal productivity of labour and elasticity of demand
(which is inversely related to the markup).
Despite this being the profit maximising principle, there are firms which
might not let the prices change even if the condition so demands. And one
of the most written about reasons is the theory of menu costs. These costs
could involve printing of new price lists and menus as well as renegotiat-
ing contracts with both the downstream and upstream firms. While they
seem trivial in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations, they produce large
macroeconomic fluctuations as shown by Mankiw [1985], Akerlof and Yellen
[1985]. So, the firms do not just take the cost of production into account but
also these menu costs while deciding whether to change their prices. Higher
the menu costs higher will be the resilience shown by prices to move towards
their profit maximising levels.
There were, however, doubts cast within this tradition on the extent to
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which small menu costs could explain the rigidity in prices. So, the menu
cost theory was appended by other real rigidities. It was argued that the
other real factors like the marginal productivity of labour or the elasticity
of demand could behave in a way that even relatively low menu costs could
generate siginificant price rigidities. So, it is possible that a fall in industry
level output does not generate a fall in prices because either the desired
markup might rise (elasticity of demand falls) as a result of greater collusion
or the marginal cost does not fall or both.
In Fig. 6, I show the implications of price rigidity generating an upward
sloping aggregate supply curve (the New Keynesian Phillips Curve or NKPC
in short), which makes output adjustment necessary for any macroeconomic
equilibrium. So, the causality in the product market moves from price rigid-
ity to output, which is below its ‘natural’ level (that determined by flexible
prices and wages) as shown by the direction of the arrows in the second
quadrant. It is important to see that if the prices had been completely flex-
ible, the NKPC will be vertical at the ‘natural’ level of output (shown by
the dotted line). At this point in the absence of wage-price rigidities, the
labour market equilibrium is given by the profit maximisation condition of
marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost i.e. labour demand curve,
which is derived from the production and demand functions under conditions
of imperfect competition, is equal to the labour supply curve determined by
the labour-leisure choice of the workers (equilibrium combination shown by
dotted lines in the fourth quadrant). It can also be seen that with an up-
ward sloping NKPC, a fall in output as a result of a demand shock leads to
an actual fall in output which does not get self-corrected since the prices do
not adjust fully.
Aggregate Demand Function The aggregate demand curve of the New
Keynesian framework is arrived through intertemporal optimisation of a
representative consumer who is trying to find an optimal bundle of labour
and consumption today given the budget constraint which, apart from the
current income, includes the income coming from purchase of bonds out
of current savings (Gal´ı [2009]). This intertemporal optimisation condition
results in today’s consumption being directly related to the expected con-
sumption tomorrow and inversely related to the expected real rate of interest
(inversely related to the expected bond price) minus the discount rate. The
inverse relation results from the fact that a higher expected rate of interest
means a higher opportunity cost for today’s consumption while a higher
discount rate gives lesser importance to tomorrow’s consumption. So, what
matters is the net impact of the two in deciding the optimal path of con-
sumption. This consumption function, in a baseline model, is converted
into the output-interest rate space by abstracting away from other sources
of demand i.e. all output is consumed.
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Figure 6: Macroeconomic Equilibrium in the New-Keynesian Framework
To understand this framework, we need to bring its two components, ag-
gregate demand and supply in the same frame. While the aggregate supply
function is located in the output-inflation plane, the demand function is in
the output-interest rate plane. They can be made compatible by converting
the demand function into the output-inflation plane. It can be done in two
ways depending on the assumption of exogenous or endogenous money. In
the case of exogenous money, for an exogenously given rate of growth of
money supply, the aggregate demand (AD) curve will be negatively related
to the rate of inflation because a fall in inflation means an increase in real
balances and, hence, a higher real balance effect. In the case of endogenous
money, the central bank can play the role of ensuring the inverse relation-
ship. A fall in inflation loosens the hands of the central bank to decrease
the interest rates and expand the level of output and vice versa. So, we still
find a downward sloping demand curve but it is generated through policy
intervention. This curve is also called the reaction function (RF as shown
in fig. 6) as it depicts the movements in output as a reaction of the policy
intervention of the central bank.
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4.2 Policy Recommendations
4.2.1 Dominance of Monetary Policy
Interest rate is the policy instrument of the Central Bank (CB). An optimal
policy rule is such that the CB tries to minimize the loss function arising
from the deviation of the actual level of output and rate of inflation from
the targeted one. As a rule of thumb, an approximation of this exercise is
now called the Taylor’s rule.
Any demand shock in the economy could be dealt with the monetary
policy instruments. An initial fall in the output will prompt the central
bank to decrease the interest rates, which for a given discount rate, increase
the level of consumption today in the baseline model. This will mitigate
the initial problem purely through a calibrated interest policy approach.
So, in normal recessions, monetary policy should be allowed to bring about
stabilisation in the economy.
A supply shock leads to an increase in inflation at all levels of output (AS
shifts up). The central bank intervenes by increasing the rate of interest,
thereby, controlling output and hence bringing inflation down (movement
down the new AS curve).
It can be seen that in their theoretical and, hence, in their policy ap-
proach, they have put Keynes [1936] on its head. The only condition in
which they do not give primacy to monetary policy is in conditions of deep
recession as is happening today where economists like Krugman are talking
in somewhat Keynesian language. What difference does a deep recession
make? It brings liquidity trap into the picture. If the level of output falls to
such an extent that it is impossible to stimulate the economy through mon-
etary policy since there is a lower bound of zero for the interest rates, active
fiscal policy will be required. Sans this possibility, expansionary fiscal policy
is distortionary. In this respect, they are consistently anti-Keynesian. So,
the same economists in the mainstream framework, who are talking the lan-
guage of Keynes, will become anti-Keynesian as soon as the Great Recession
is over.
4.2.2 Supply-Side Policies and the Labour Market
Lindbeck and Snower [1988] argue that the bargaining power of the insiders
need to reduced whereas those of the outsiders increased for the involuntary
unemployment to be reduced. So, the policy recommendations with respect
to the insiders are as follows: (a) reducing the hiring and firing costs through
softening of job security legislation; (b) reformed labour laws to lessen the
powers of the trade unions and the likelihood of strikes. On the other hand,
to enhance the powers of the outsiders, following steps could be taken: (a)
to increase the marginal productivity of labour through improved training;
(b) improving labour mobility; (c) profit-sharing arrangements which bring
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greater flexibility to wages; (d) keep the unemployment compensations low
so that they act as an incentive for job search.
5 Conclusion
The current Great Recession, the worst crisis that capitalism has faced since
the Great Depression, has failed, at least so far, to generate a change in the
teaching and practice of Macroeconomics. This seems bizarre as if nothing
has happened and the economists are just going about doing business as
usual. In light of this, the current paper attempted to address how Macroe-
conomics ought to be taught to students at the advanced intermediate level,
which gives them an overall perspective on the subject.
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